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Abstract
The advancement of wireless applications and emergence of new technologies over the
past decades has increased the demand for spectrum licenses. This has also increased
the complementary nature of licenses reducing the effectiveness of auction mechanisms
previously used in spectrum allocation. This especially affects the popular SMRA
model which has produced good results in the past, but has poor ability to deal with
complementary products. Therefore new auction mechanisms must be developed.
This thesis focuses on theoretical analysis of the most prominent spectrum auction
model called the combinatorial clock auction model. CCA model’s biggest advantage
over other models is its ability to deal with complementary licenses which eliminates the
exposure risk and helps the government to reach efficient allocation of radio spectrum.
Due to the complexity of the model, the previously popular SMRA and ascending clock
auction models will have their applications in the future, but CCA is likely to outper-
form them in more complex settings. Empirical results show that CCA is producing
good outcomes but as the number of licenses grows the auction rules require tweaking
in order to maintain the high efficiency.
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Tiivistelma¨
Langattoman teknologian kehitys ja applikaatioiden yleistyminen on kasvattanut radio-
taajuuksien ka¨ytto¨lupien kysynta¨a¨ merkitta¨va¨sti. Samalla komplementaarisuudet eri
lisenssien ja taajuuskaistojen va¨lilla¨ ovat vahvistuneet, heikenta¨en aikaisemmin ka¨ytetty-
jen huutokauppamallien tehokkuutta. Eritoten aikaisemmin yleispa¨teva¨ SMRA-malli
on kohdannut suuria haasteita, koska sen kyky johtaa komplementaaristen lisenssien
tehokkaaseen allokaatioon on heikko. Ta¨ma¨ on lisa¨nnyt tarvetta uusille huutokauppa-
malleille, joiden avulla radiotaajuudet voidaan allokoida aikaisempaa tehokkaammin.
Ta¨ma¨ tyo¨ keskittyy ta¨lla¨ hetkella¨ lupaavimman huutokauppamallin, kombinatorisen
kellohuutokaupan teoreettiseen analyysin. Kombinatorisen kellohuutokaupan suurin
vahvuus on sen kyky toimia tehokkaasti, kun lisenssien va¨lilla¨ on komplementaarisuuk-
sia. Ta¨ma¨n myo¨ta¨ huutokaupan voittajien riski voittaa vain osa haluamistaan lisens-
seista¨ ha¨via¨a¨ ja valtion kyky allokoida lisenssit tehokkaasti paranee. Huutokauppa-
mallin monimutkaisuudesta johtuen aikaisemmin ka¨ytetyt mallit, kuten SMRA ja tavalli-
nen kellohuutokauppa, tulevat olemaan ta¨rkea¨ssa¨ roolissa tulevaisuudessakin, mutta
kombinatorinen kellohuutokauppamalli todenna¨ko¨isesti johtaa parempiin lopputulok-
siin, kun lisenssien va¨lilla¨ on vahvoja komplementaarisuuksia. Ka¨yta¨nno¨n tulokset
ovat osoittaneet etta¨ kombinatorinen kellohuutokauppa tuottaa hyvia¨ tuloksia, mutta
lisenssien lukuma¨a¨ra¨n kasvaessa huutokaupan sa¨a¨do¨kset tulevat vaatimaan kehitysta¨.
Avainsanat: Taajuushuutokauppa, useiden tuotteiden huutokauppa, kombinatorinen
kellohuutokauppa, SMRA-malli
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1 Introduction
Most people have heard the term electromagnetic waves or might even know what they
are, but rarely do people comprehend how meaningful part they play in our everyday
life. These immaterial signals that fill the air and pass through our bodies non-stop
enable us to use the Internet, watch television, listen to the radio, and make phone calls
to the other side of the world. All these applications utilize electromagnetic waves that
are part of radio spectrum, which consists of frequencies between 9 Hz and 300 GHz. The
use of the radio spectrum is managed by the international telecommunications union
(ITU), which determines the frequencies used for different applications such as mobile
communication, civil aviation, military use, and satellite communications. Figure 1
shows an excerpt of the frequency allocation between 470 MHz and 1 GHz.1
Figure 1: Frequency allocation plan in 470 MHz - 1 GHz range.
In many cases, especially with frequencies that are used for commercial services such as
mobile communications, the spectrum use is further regulated by the local governments
that award licenses allowing specific parties to use the frequencies. This process is
generally referred to as spectrum allocation and is in many ways comparable to the
process of awarding rights to exploit other national resources, such as minerals or oil.
While the available frequency range is seemingly large, only lower part of the spectrum
is useful for long-range communication making the allocation of spectrum rights an
important topic for the governments.
1Full allocation plan is published by the ECC and is available at
https://www.ecodocdb.dk/download/2ca5fcbd-4090/ERCREP025.pdf
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Before 1990s only few services, such as radio and TV broadcasting, utilized the radio
spectrum and the allocation of spectrum rights presented few issues to the governments.
However, over the past decades the emergence of countless new wireless technologies
and applications has increased the demand for spectrum rights exponentially increasing
the value of the radio spectrum as well as transforming it from an abundand resource
to a scarce one. The advancement of technology also constantly changes the spec-
trum allocations plans. For example, many of the frequencies that are used for mobile
communications today used to be allocated for analog television broadcasting.
Allocation of spectrum rights, just like any other scarce public resource, is an impor-
tant topic as it has a direct effect on social welfare. When distributing licenses the first
priority should always be efficient allocation of the radio spectrum. Efficient allocation
means that the licenses are not just awarded to the party that offers to pay the highest
price, but rather the companies that end up with licenses should have the means and
resources to provide the best possible services to the consumers. The second priority
should be to promote competition in the end market to make sure that the services
are available to the consumers at a reasonable cost. Moreover, competition encourages
companies to innovate and promote technological advancement. Governments should
also try to maximize revenue but only subject to the other objectives.(Binmore and
Klemperer, 2002)
Until early 1990s the spectrum rights were often awarded using beauty contests where
the companies submitted plans for how they would use the spectrum if they were
awarded the rights, and the government then allocated the spectrum based on those
plans. This method is very opaque and therefore highly susceptible to favoritism and
corruption. Another relatively common allocation method was simply organizing a lot-
tery among the interested companies. Lotteries are fair and transparent, but there are
no guarantees that the spectrum rights will be utilized effectively as it is unlikely that
the company that values the spectrum most wins the lottery. As the wireless tech-
nologies started to develop and new applications emerge, the old allocation methods
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were not sufficient anymore, and governments started to look for alternative solutions,
mainly auctions. Even though the idea of allocating spectrum rights using auctions
dates back to the 1950s (Coase, 2013), the first spectrum auction did not take place
until 1994 when the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) used a simultaneous
ascending auction to distribute phone licenses in the US. Ever since, auctions have been
the main tool used by the governments around the world when it comes to allocation
of radio spectrum. (Cramton, 2013)
The goal of this paper is to first introduce the reader to spectrum auctions and cover
the most commonly used auction models to date, as well as their biggest shortcomings.
The main focus of the paper is the combinatorial clock auction model which is the
most promising auction model to overcome the issues that have been faced in past
auctions. The paper is structured in the following way: First the most important
characteristics of spectrum auctions are discussed as well as the most important goals
the government should keep in mind when designing spectrum auctions. After that the
discussion shifts to the auction models: a short theoretical analysis of the most common
multi-unit auction models is presented, which is followed by a discussion covering the
common auction models used in spectrum allocation as well as the most common issues
governments have faced when allocating the spectrum licenses. Chapter 5 provides a
detailed analysis of the combinatorial clock auction model, including its strengths and
weaknesses, and a short empirical analysis. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the paper.
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2 Spectrum auctions
Empirical results over the past decades have shown that the auctions are a far more
efficient mechanism for spectrum allocation than lotteries or beauty contests. One of
the most important aspects of auctions is price discovery. In a beauty contest where
companies present their business plans they have little incentive to reveal their true
valuation for the spectrum, but a well-designed auction almost forces companies to
reveal that information, which helps governments to award the licenses to the companies
that value the spectrum most. Auctions are also quicker and cheaper to organize
than beauty contests, which require a significant amount of time and resources from
both parties, the operators and the government. Moreover, auctions have a set of pre-
determined rules that must be followed, which makes auctions transparent to all the
competitors, as well as the public, so no party will be left wondering why they lost, or
whether or not there was any foul play. Lastly, auctions can raise significant revenues
to the government that can be used improve the wellbeing of the consumers. However,
even though it has been more than two decades since the introduction of spectrum
auctions, there is still no general consensus on the best auction model for allocation of
spectrum rights.(McMillan, 1995; Binmore and Klemperer, 2002; Bichler and Goeree,
2017)
This chapter describes the common characteristics related to spectrum auctions and
takes a closer look at the goals governments should be looking to achieve when orga-
nizing spectrum auctions.
2.1 General characteristics
Planning a spectrum auction usually start with a certain frequency block being reserved
for telecommunication services. The frequencies may have been previously used for
other purposes or in some cases the advancement of technology has created demand
for frequencies that had no real use in the past. The frequency range is then divided
into several smaller blocks that are auctioned to the buyers. As a result each winner
of the auction has a frequency range reserved only for their use. Figure 2 shows an
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example of the division and final allocation of the 700 MHz frequencies in Finland after
the licenses were auctioned in 2016.
Figure 2: Spectrum allocation in 700 MHz range in Finland.
As in the figure, frequencies are often paired for technological reasons: one part of the
frequency pair is used as an uplink while the other is used as a downlink. For operators
it would be highly beneficial if both parts of a frequency pair were adjacent to each
other and formed a single wider block of frequency as this can reduce the technological
challenges considerably when developing the services. This is an important considera-
tion for the auctioneer in cases where the uplink range and downlink range form one
continuous block: if the frequencies are paired in a way that one pair is significantly
more valuable than others, the strongest operator, i.e., the one with the largest budget,
would gain a big advantage over other operators, which might hurt the competitive
environment in the end market. On the other hand, pairing the frequencies in another
way will lead to lower prices and reduce the revenue the government collects from the
auction.
Another aspect the government must consider when dividing the spectrum, and one
that truly sets spectrum auctions apart from most multi-item auctions, is the possible
existence of complementarities.2 Spectrum blocks can be divided into two classes:
substitutes and complements. If two blocks are substitutes, the bidders’ valuation is the
same for both spectrum block and they are indifferent to which product they win. In a
2Complementarity of products is not limited to spectrum auctions, or even auctions in general, but
they are an important consideration in, e.g., sale of franchising rights or forest sell-offs as well. (Levin,
1997).
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case like this the auction design becomes a relatively simple problem to solve. However,
in most cases there are complementarities across spectrum blocks, which means that
the value of one license depends on the other licenses held by the same operator. In
other words, value of some combinations of spectrum licenses is higher than the sum of
the individual license values. For two licenses A and B this can be summarized with a
simple inequality VA+B > VA + VB, where Vi denotes the value of license in question.
Complementarities usually stem from technological or geographical reasons. For an
operator it would be highly beneficial to win rights to adjacent spectrum blocks as that
would loosen the technological restrictions when developing the services and allow for
higher transfer capacity. On the other hand, especially in markets like the US, the
value of spectrum licenses often depends on the licenses held by the same operator in
adjacent geographical areas. The license for block A in New York is much more valuable
to the operator holding the rights to the same frequencies in New Jersey than to other
operators.(Chan et al., 2003)
Recognizing the complementarities is just as important to the auctioneer than it is to
the operators because failure to recognize complementarities when dividing the spec-
trum into smaller blocks could give some operators an unfair advantage in the end
market or prevent the auction from reaching an efficient outcome. Analyzing the com-
plementarities also helps the auctioneer to set the reserve prices3 as accurately as pos-
sible. Setting the reserve prices too high could result in unsold spectrum while setting
them too low could slow the auction process unnecessarily. Moreover, the possibility
of complementarities eliminates the use of some traditional auction mechanisms, such
as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism, that rely on the assumption of uniform
valuations.4(Cramton, 2013)
3Reserve price is the starting price in the auction. It can also thought to be the government’s op-
portunity cost for selling the spectrum. At prices below reserve price it would be better for government
to hold on to the spectrum rights instead of selling them.
4VCG mechanism will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 3.3
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2.2 Goals of spectrum auction design
In an auction with private sellers the auction design process is usually very straight-
forward as the only question in seller’s mind is ’How can I maximize the revenue?’.
However, when the auctioning party is the government, things get more complicated.
If the government was only thinking about revenue maximization when allocating the
spectrum, the best solution would almost certainly be to sell all of the spectrum rights
to the party that offers to pay the highest price. The problem is that this would create
a monopoly in the end market for wireless services, increasing consumer prices, driving
other operators out of business, increasing unemployment, and likely slowing down the
technological advancement. While revenues gained from the auction would be high, it
would not be enough to offset these negative externalities. Therefore, instead of taking
the revenue maximization approach, the government should aim to maximize the social
benefit gained from the spectrum. To achieve this, the auction must be designed with
several goals in mind. As Binmore and Klemperer (2002) summarized, the auction
design should aim to
• Assign the spectrum efficiently;
• Promote competition;
• Realize the full economic value (subject to other objectives).
It is important to understand that setting the design goals for an auction is not an
exact science, and arguments could be made for lengthening or shortening the list,
but it should also be kept in mind that the auction mechanism must remain simple,
transparent, and fair. Adding a long list of design goals can unnecessarily increase the
complexity of the auction design, which can in turn affect the efficiency of the auction
in unforeseen ways. In fact, Bazelon (2009) argues that the abundant design goals were
the main reason for the poor results in the FCC’s auction for 700 MHz licenses in 2008.
2.2.1 Efficient allocation of spectrum
Efficient allocation of spectrum should be the number one priority for the government.
First of all, the government should ensure that all of the spectrum is put into use. This
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is an important consideration when choosing the reserve prices, as discussed in Chapter
2.1. If the reserve prices are set too high the government faces the threat of having
unsold spectrum at the end of the auction. This is the problem Turkey faced in 2000
when it auctioned off two spectrum lots in sequential auctions. For the second auction
the reserve price was the sale price of the first lot. However, the price ended up being
too high for any other operator to pay, and the second block was left unsold.
The second aspect of efficient allocation of spectrum is to award the licenses to the
operators that have the resources and means to put the spectrum into best possible
use. Coincidentally, this often corresponds to firms that value the spectrum most,
which further strenghtens the argument for paying less attention to the revenue: if the
allocation is efficient, the auction should, by default, raise high revenues.
2.2.2 Promotion of competition
The auction design should be such that it allocates the spectrum in a manner that
creates a competitive end market. This way the wireless services are available to the
consumers at reasonable prices and the competitive environment encourages compa-
nies to develop the services further speeding up the technological advancement in the
country. This is generally achieved by dividing the spectrum into smaller blocks and
limiting the number of blocks any operator can win in the auction. The division of
spectrum must be done carefully, as discussed in Chapter 2.1. In Chapter 5 we will see
how combinatorial clock auction model helps the government by shifting the allocation
problem partly to the bidders.
The auction should also be designed in a way that it increases competition during the
auction process, i.e., makes participants to bid competitively. This means that the
auction mechanism should promote truthful bidding in order to enable price discovery.
This is usually achieved by enforcing certain activity and eligibility rules, which will be
discussed in more detail in the following chapters.
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2.2.3 Revenue considerations
So far this chapter has introduced arguments against favoring revenue maximization in
the auction design process, but it does not mean they should be ignored completely.
In fact, if the revenue aspect of spectrum allocation was ignored, one could argue that
auctions are not needed at all. There are at least two important reasons why it is
important to organize an auction that raises as much revenues as possible, as long as it
is not prioritized over efficient allocation and competitive end market. First of all, the
revenues raised by the government can be used to increase social gains even further.
Whether the money collected from the auction is used to improve infrastructure or
reduce taxing, it is going to improve the social wellbeing of the consumers. Second
of all, when companies have to pay significant sums to acquire the spectrum rights,
they are more likely to stand behind their business plans and even encourage them to
develop the services faster. (Cramton and Schwartz, 2002; Binmore and Klemperer,
2002)
The most common argument against collecting revenues from spectrum allocation is
that the firms’ costs will be passed on to the consumers. There is, however, a major
flaw in this thinking: once the companies start to offer the wireless services to the
consumer, the price they paid for the spectrum price is a sunk cost and should not
affect their pricing decisions in any way. (McMillan, 1995)
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3 Multi-unit auction models
Whenever auctions are mentioned, most people would automatically start thinking
about traditional auctions where throughout the auction the price for an item increases
as participants place bids exceeding the previous standing high bid. This is the most
common auction model and is extensively used in, e.g., art auction and online auctions.
Auctions like these can be characterized as ascending price single-item auctions and are
often called English auctions.
Alternatively, auction can also have descending prices where the auctioneer announces
a price in the beginning of an auction and starts to lower it little by little until one of
the participants accepts the price and wins the item. An auction like this is usually
called a Dutch auction, for historical reasons.
Auctions can also be classified as either open or closed auctions. In an open auction,
like the English auction, the bid information is public to all participants, i.e., every
bidder knows the current price at all times. In a closed auction (often referred to as a
sealed-bid auction), the participants submit bids to the auctioneer who then reviews all
the bids and announces the winner – the bidder who placed the highest bid. The most
common sealed-bid auction type is the Vickrey auction that uses second price pricing:
The winner of the auction is the bidder who placed the highest bid, but the price they
pay for the item is the second highest bid placed in the auction, i.e., the highest losing
bid.
Aforementioned auction models are all single-item auctions where only one item is sold
at a time. However, in many cases this is not enough but instead the auctioneer wants
to sell several items at the same time. Auctions like these are called multi-unit auctions,
and they are the main focus of this chapter.
Selling multiple items at the same time naturally complicates the auction design because
in most cases additional rules are required to define, for example, the bidders’ ability
to shift bids from one item to another or withdraw bids – something that does not need
to be considered or allowed in single-item auctions. For bidders the decision-making
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process gets more complicated as they will have more options available to them. This
chapter covers some of the most common multi-unit auctions and issues related to them
while also laying the foundation for better understanding the spectrum auction models
that will be discussed in detail in Chapter 4.
3.1 Simultaneous ascending auction
Simultaneous ascending auction (SAA) is an extension of English auction but for mul-
tiple items that are sold simultaneously. In a SAA an own English auction is set up
for each of the items to be sold, and the auctions are ran concurrently. Each auction
consists of multiple rounds and they proceed in unison. Typically after each round the
auctioneer announces the standing high bids for all items and the bidders currently
holding said bids. In the following round the bidders currently not holding the highest
bid for any of the items can place new bids that must exceed the current high bid by at
least a pre-determined minimum price increment, while current high bidders often have
no incentive to place additional bids. Most of the time the auction rules dictate that
each bidder must remain active throughout the auction, i.e., place a bid unless they
were holding the highest bid at the start of the round, in order to increase transparency
and reduce bid sniping opportunities5.
The auction ends once none of the items receive qualifying bids during a single round.
The main advantage over sequential auctions is that in a SAA the bidders have the
ability to observe the prices of all items throughout the auction and can therefore bid
on the most profitable one(s) each round. In a sequential auction the bidders would
have to consider not only their valuation and the current price in the auction, but also
the possible outcomes of the following auctions.
Simultaneous ascending auction process is easiest described with a simple example
where four homogeneous items are sold among five participants. If the items are truly
homogeneous and the bidders understand it, all of them will value all of the items the
5Bid sniping refers to the action where bidders hide their preference early in the auction just to
jump in at the last minute and place a large bid.
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same, and therefore they are indifferent regarding which item they win. In this case
the optimal strategy is to always bid on the cheapest available item as long as any
item’s standing high bid is below their private valuation. Suppose that the starting
price for the items is 100, minimum price increment is 10, and private valuation of each
participant is as described in Table 1.
Table 1: Bidders’ valuation for a single item
Bidder B1 B2 B3 B4 B5
Valuation for a single item 200 200 180 170 150
In the first round each bidder places a bid of 100 on one of the items and the outcome
could look something like shown in Table 2.
Table 2: Bids placed during the first round of the auction. Bidder(s) in parantheses.
Bidder Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4
Round 1 100 (B1) 100 (B2) 100 (B3) 100 (B4, B5)
Bidders B4 and B5 are the only ones without a standing high bids after the first round
and they will therefore increase their bids. Bidders B1 through B3 are currently holding
standing high bids and will therefore not make bids on round 2. Let us assume that B4
decides to bid 110 on item 1 while B5 increases her bid to 110 for item 4. The situation
after the second round is shown in Table 3.
Table 3: Standing high bids after the second round of the auction.
Bidder Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4
Round 1 100 (B1) 100 (B2) 100 (B3) 100 (B4, B5)
Round 2 110 (B4) 100 (B2) 100 (B3) 110 (B5)
Now B1 is the only one without a standing high bid and she will therefore place a bid
of 110 on one of the two items currently priced at 100. Other bidders have no reason to
make additional bids on round three as they are currently holding the highest bid on
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an item. If B1 bids on item two, then B2 will face a similar situation in round 4 and
will bid 110 on item 3, the only one priced at 100 at that point.
At this point the auction has been going on for four rounds, all the items are priced at
110, and B3 is the only one without a standing high bid.6 The same process would then
repeat over the next four rounds resulting in all items priced at 120 and one bidder
without a standing high bid. This would go on until all the prices eventually reach
150, the lowest private valuation, after 20 rounds. At this point the allocation could
look something like shown in Table 4. Auction ends once B5 is outbid for the final time.7
Table 4: Auction after 20 rounds.
Bidder Item 1 Item 2 Item 3 Item 4
Round 1 100 (B1) 100 (B2) 100 (B3) 100 (B4, B5)
Round 2 110 (B4) 100 (B2) 100 (B3) 110 (B5)
.
.
.
Round 20 150 (B1) 150 (B2) 150 (B3) 150 (B4,B5)
If a single bidder is allowed to win multiple items, the decision-making in a SAA gets a
little bit more complicated as the bidders must determine the most profitable package
each round, i.e., consider the marginal value of additional items. From the seller’s point
of view the SAA model is a relatively safe auction model but can require plenty of
resources as noticed in the previous example. SAAs and its applications are commonly
used in the sale of spectrum rights and the intricacies of the model will be discussed in
detail in Chapter 4.
6During round 4 B3, the bidder holding the bid of 100 on item 3, could have predicted B2’s intentions
and therefore increased her own bid. However, if B2’s valuation was below 110 and she was therefore
not going to make an additional bid, B3 would have ended up overpaying.
7This could happen already in round 21 if B4 increases her bid on item 4, and will at latest happen
after round 24 when all items reach the price of 160.
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3.2 Clock auction
Clock auction is a type of ascending price multiround auction where the auctioneer
announces prices for the items to be sold and participants submit their demands at
current price. The simplest version of the clock auction is one where each bidder can
win a maximum of one item. In this case the auctioneer announces the price and
participants signal either yes or no to indicate whether they are willing to pay that
price or not. Once the number of bidders signaling yes equals the number of items to
be sold, the auction ends and the items are allocated to the bidders signaling yes in the
last round.
If winning multiple items is allowed, the bidders signal the amount of items they are
willing to buy at the current price. After each round the auctioneer sums the demands
and if the aggregate demand exceeds the supply, the auction moves on to the next
round with increased prices, and participants submit new demands. Once the demand
drops to the level of supply or below it, demand is said to be market clearing, auction
ends, and the items are allocated according to the participants’ demands.
The most common clock auction format uses uniform pricing, where all items are sold at
the market clearing price. However, another option is to use a clinching rule originally
proposed by Ausubel (2004). In this case some items may be clinched before the final
round. This happens when the total demand is above supply but the total demand
without a specific bidder’s demand is below supply. In other words, if DTOT > S and
DTOT −DBi < S then bidder Bi would clinch S− (DTOT −DBi) items. This is because
without bidder Bi these items would be left unsold and therefore they are allocated to
bidder Bi at the current price.
The following example illustrates the clock auction process with clinching rule in more
detail. Consider an auction where 30 homogenous items are sold among five participants
A, B, C, D, and E. The starting price per item is 1 and it is increased in increments
of 0.10. Table 5 shows the evolution of demands throughout the auction. The auction
ends after round 7 when demand is equal to the supply of 30.
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Table 5: Clock auction outcome for ten homogenous items.
Round Price A B C D E Post-round actions
1 1 15 12 12 10 8 Price increased
2 1.1 12 10 12 10 8 Price increased
3 1.2 12 8 10 8 5 Price increased
4 1.3 12 8 8 8 5 A clinches 1 item
5 1.4 10 7 7 7 5 A clinches 3; B,C, and D clinch 1
6 1.5 10 6 6 6 5 A clinches 3; B,C, and D clinch 2
7 1.6 10 6 6 5 3 Auction ends
Table 6 shows the final allocation and prices each participant pays, as well as the av-
erage price per item. Bidder A who submitted the highest demand throughout the
auction was rewarded with the lowest average price per item and therefore the example
shows how the clinching rule can be used to encourage truthful bidding. Without the
clinching rule the outcome with the same bidding behavior would be more favorable to
the auctioneer as all the items would be sold at a price of 1.6, which is approximately
5 % higher than the average price with the clinching rule. However, this might encour-
age participants to collude, which could result in lower-than-expected revenues for the
seller. Collusion, especially in the form of demand reduction, will be discussed in more
detail later in this chapter.
Table 6: Summary of clock auction results.
Price A B C D E
1.3 1 0 0 0 0
1.4 3 1 1 1 0
1.5 3 2 2 2 0
1.6 3 3 3 2 3
Total 10 6 6 5 3
Average price 1.48 1.53 1.53 1.52 1.6
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The power of clock auction model in allocation of homogenous items is apparent: Using
a simultaneous ascending auction model, the sale of 30 items would require 30 individual
auctions, whereas the use of clock auction model allowed the same allocation to be
reached with one auction and only seven rounds. Similar result can be noticed by re-
visiting the example used to describe the SAA process where four homogenous items
were sold among five bidders. If the same items were sold in a clock auction the price
for the items would increase by 10 each round resulting in the auction ending after only
six rounds, compared to 20+ rounds SAA model required.
These two examples show how the use of clock auction model can significantly reduce the
resources required to sell the items as well as simplify the process for bidders compared
to simultaneous ascending auction model. Clock auctions are widely used in, e.g., sale
of electricity and emission permits. Clock auctions have one big inherent problem: it is
perfectly possible that the demand drops from above supply to below supply during one
round, leaving some of the items unsold. This feature severely limits the clock auction
model’s suitability for spectrum auctions. However, clock auction model is one of the
cornerstones of the combinatorial clock auction model, which is the focus of Chapter 5.
3.3 Vickrey-Clarke-Groves auction
Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) auction is a multi-unit extension of the Vickrey auction,
originally proposed by William Vickrey in (1961). Vickrey discussed the strengths of
the second-price sealed-bid auction in selling individual items and showed that truthful
bidding is the dominant strategy for the bidders. It is easy to see why this is the case.
Let us consider a situation where two bidders A and B are participating in an auction
for an item, and A’s private valuation for the item is 6. If A bids above her valuation
bA = 6 + α, where α > 0 she enables a situation to occur where B’s bid is 6 + β, where
0 < β < α. This would mean that A wins the auction and pays B’s bid, which would
lead to a profit of −β and A would have been better off not bidding at all and ending
up with a profit of zero. On the other hand, if A bids below their valuation bA = 6−α
then it is possible that B bids 6 − β and A would have made a profit of β by bidding
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bA = 6. Only by bidding her valuation can A guarantee that she never must pay above
their valuation and never misses out on potential profit. An auction like this where
truthful bidding is optimal is said to be incentive compatible.
Later Clarke (1971) and Groves (1973) showed that the model extends well to multi-
unit auctions and that the dominant strategy is still to bid truthfully. The multi-unit
model is often referred to as Vickrey-Clarge-Groves mechanism, or VCG for short. The
VCG mechanism is studied extensively in the literature and detailed analyses can be
found in, e.g., (Milgrom, 2004c) and (Mocho´n and Sa´ez, 2015). The results show that
in a VCG auction, as in a Vickrey auction, bidding truthfully is a dominant strategy for
the bidders. Moreover, if the bidders do bid truthfully the auction leads to an efficient
allocation of items.
The following example demonstrates the use of VCG mechanism in an auction with four
bidders B1, B2, B3, and B4 for two items A and B. The bidding behavior is presented
in Table 7.
Table 7: VCG auction example with four bidders and two items.
Item B1 B2 B3 B4
A 6 0 2 3
B 0 6 4 2
Having placed the highest bids, bidder B1 wins the item A and bidder B2 wins the
item B. The prices they pay for the items are, respectively, 3 and 4. Figure 3 shows the
outcome of the auction graphically where each line represents an individual bid. The
shaded area is called the core, which is defined, as Cramton (2013) puts it:
“The core is defined as set of payments that support the efficient assignment in the
sense that there does not exist an alternative coalition of bidders that has collectively
offered the seller more.”
All points within the core present an efficient solution to the pricing problem and
Vicrey-solution lies in the south-west corner of the core, which means that it is the
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Figure 3: Vickrey solution for multi-unit auction.
bidder-optimal solution within the core. In other words, Vickrey prices are the lowest
prices that still guarantee an efficient allocation. It is worth noting that the number of
items or bidders does not complicate the VCG auction because only the highest and
second highest bids are important for finding the efficient allocation of items (just like
in Figure 3 the bids illustrated with dashed lines play no role in finding the winners
and payments).
While VCG mechanism is resource-friendly and results in an efficient outcome, it does
increase variation in revenue for the seller, which might make risk-averse sellers hesitant
to use it. To illustrate this, consider the previous example but now the bidder B1 is
the only one interested in item A and therefore the item receives only one bid in the
auction. This would result in the selling price for A to be zero, while with a simulta-
neous ascending auction model the price would be at least the reserve price for the item.
A version of VCG mechanism could also be applied in the example situation discussed
before where five homogenous items were auctioned among four bidders. In this case
instead of second price auction, a nth price pricing is used, where n equals the number
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of items plus one. Since all the items are substitutes, the auctioneer can ask bidders
to submit bids indicating their willingness-to-pay for a single item and then allocate
the items for four bidders with the highest willingness-to-pay. The final price would be
the highest losing bid, i.e., the fifth highest bid. A model like this can be very effective
as the auction only requires one round of bidding and the optimal strategy is to bid
truthfully. However, if the items are not substitutes as is often the case in spectrum
auctions, the model runs into several problems. The shortcoming of the VCG model in
spectrum auctions will be discussed in detail in Chapter 5.
3.4 Typical issues in multi-unit auctions
This section covers some of the most common issues that can lead to an inefficient
auction outcome in multi-unit auctions. These issues are an important consideration
for the seller when deciding which auction mechanism to use. Empirical evidence can
be found of many of these problems arising in real life spectrum auctions. These will
be discussed in more detail in Chapter 4.3 while this chapter concentrates on the the-
oretical aspects of the issues.
Demand reduction
Demand reduction is a form of collusion that refers to bidders purposely reducing their
demand in an auction with the intention of making the auction end early and at low
prices. In a worst-case scenario (from seller’s point of view) the participants reach a
silent agreement regarding the allocation of items in the opening round and the items
are sold at reserve prices. If bidders understand that bidding aggressively is going to
not only increase the prices for other participants but for themselves as well, demand
reduction can take place even if bidders are not explicitly colluding. In an auction where
bidders have declining marginal values, the incentives for reducing demand early on can
be particularly strong. Some auction models, such as uniform price clock auction, are
especially vulnerable to demand reduction as there may exist low-revenue equilibria en-
couraging bidders to collude. Demand reduction and low-revenue equilibria are studied
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extensively by, e.g., Ausubel and Schwartz (1999), Engelbrecht-Wiggans (2005), and
Akaichi et. al. (2014).
Signaling
Signaling refers to bidders using different means to communicate their preferences and
interests to other participants throughout the auction in order to discourage them from
bidding on the items they are interested in themselves. Signaling can be especially
beneficial for bidders in simultaneous ascending auctions where each item is sold in an
individual auction. Common signaling tactics include, e.g., jump bids, retaliatory bids,
bid withdrawals, and use of trailing digits.
Jump bidding refers to increasing a current highest bid by more than the minimum bid
increment. This way bidders can message others that they are extremely interested in
the item in question and that the others should stay way. Retaliatory bidding refers to
one bidder punishing another for bidding on the ”wrong” item. For example, consider
a situation where bidder A has the standing highest bid on item 1 and bidder B has
the standing highest bid on item 2. Bidder A now places a bid on item 2 outbidding
bidder B. Bidder B can either increase their bid on item 1 or retaliate by outbidding
bidder A on item 1, regardless of their true preferences.
Bid withdrawals are not as common and require specific auction rules where withdraw-
ing standing high bids are allowed. Under these condition bidders can place the highest
bid on an item and immediately withdraw it and that way signal that they are not truly
interested in that specific item. Finally, the use of trailing digits refers to tailoring the
bid amounts in a way that the final digits in a bid send a message indicating their
preferences.
As it turns out, bid signaling has been used extensively in spectrum auctions and em-
pirical evidence of all aforementioned signaling tactics can be found from the literature,
and will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 4.3.
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Winner’s curse
Winner’s curse is a phenomenon where the true value of the item is uncertain and over-
estimation leads to overbidding. In this case the winner of the auction is the party that
has made the largest mistakes when estimating the value of the item. Winner’s curse
can occur especially in first-price auction where the payment is equal to the winning
bid. Even though winner’s curse may lead to high revenues for the seller, the problem is
that when the bidders are aware of the possible winner’s curse, i.e., there is significant
uncertainty in valuations, they are likely to bid more cautiously in the auction and that
way decrease the revenues for the seller. Therefore it is in the interest of all parties
that winner’s curse is eliminated from the auction. (Klemperer, 2002)
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4 Auction models used in spectrum allocation
This chapter shifts the discussion to spectrum auction environment by presenting the
most common auction models used in spectrum allocation as well as discussing the typ-
ical issues that have been faced in real-world spectrum auctions over the past decades.
4.1 Simultaneous multiround auction
Ever since the introduction of auctions in spectrum allocation by the FCC in 1994,
simultaneous multiround auction (SMRA) has been by far the most popular auction
model for spectrum allocation, and vast majority of spectrum auctions all over the world
have used some modification of it. SMRA is essentially a simultenous ascending auction
(described in Chapter 3.1), where each spectrum block is sold in its own auction, and
all auctions are ran simultaneously. The opening bids are determined by the reserve
prices set by the government before the auction. There is no predetermined number of
rounds but rather the auction continues as long as there are active bidders in any of the
auctions. The auctions use sealed bids and after each round participants are informed
about the highest bid on each item, and usually the bidder identity as well.8
4.1.1 Auction rules
Over the past decades governments have incorporated several additional rules to the
SMRAs, the most important one being the activity rule. Activity rules are used to
ensure that participants must be active throughout the auction, i.e., they can not sit
back early on and jump in at the later stages of the auction. The main purpose of the
activity rules is to increase the openness of the auction by encouraging participants to
reveal their true preferences and therefore enable price discovery. The most common
activity rule in SMRAs is a simple monotonicity rule that states that if a bidder cur-
8The level of transparency may vary a lot from auction to auction. In some cases only the bid
amounts are released to the participants between the rounds but not bidder identities. Similarly, after
the auction, in some cases full bidding activity throughout the auction is released to the public (e.g.,
German 4G auction in 2010) while in some other cases only the winners and the winning bid amounts
are released (e.g., Finnish spectrum auctions).
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rently not holding the highest bid for any of the licenses fails to submit a qualifying bid
during a round, loses their eligibility to bid on any of the licenses in the further rounds.
Usually due to the high stakes of the spectrum auctions the auctioneer grants bidders
a certain amount of waivers that allow bidders to skip a round in order to reconsider
their valuations, or negotiate with their financiers. Another common variation of the
activity rule is a quantity-based rule, which is useful in auctions where bidding on mul-
tiple licenses is allowed. In this case, bidders are not allowed to increase the number of
licenses they bid on during the auction. For example, if a bidder bids on three licenses
in the first round, they can bid on maximum of three licenses in the future rounds. In
other words, bids must be consistent with a downward sloping demand curve. (Ausubel
et al., 2006)
Bid withdrawals may be allowed in order for participants to be able to re-evaluate
their preferences throughout the auction. However, allowing for withdrawals has the
drawback of possibly increasing the length of the auction or open up the possibility
for predatory activities, and therefore withdrawals often result in a penalty. After a
standing high bid is withdrawn, the auctioneer becomes the standing high bidder and
the reserve price for the item is the second highest submitted bid.
While uniform pricing (i.e., all items are eventually sold at the same price) may be ap-
plied in SMRAs, pay-your-bid rule is generally more preferable because it gives bidders
less incentive to strategically reduce demand early in the auction. It is worth noting
though, that if items are pure substitutes, pay-your-bid pricing is likely to end with
all items selling for approximately the same price since bidders will always bid on the
cheapest item. Minimum bid increment is usually set at 5-10 % to control the length
of the auction. (Cramton et al., 2006)
SMRAs have proven to work well in many situations but several issues still persist.
More specifically, SMRAs have worked well in auctions where there are no technolog-
ical or geographical complementarities, and all bidders’ valuations for the licenses are
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homogeneous. However, when these conditions are not met, especially when comple-
mentarities are present, issues such as exposure risk may become a reality and SMRA
often fails to achieve an efficient allocation of the spectrum. (Chan et al., 2003; Bichler
and Goeree, 2017; Milgrom, 2004a)
4.2 Ascending clock auction and variants
Due to relatively high likelihood of inefficient outcomes, ascending clock auctions have
not been a popular choice for spectrum allocation in the past. For this reason it is dif-
ficult to discuss the auction process and rules the same way that was done for SMRA.
Instead, some of the auctions that have implemented some variant of ascending clock
auction model will be discussed here.
In 1999 the German 3G licenses were sold using a sequential ascending clock auction
model where during each round one participant places a bid which is then used as
a reserve price for the following round where another bidder places their bid. The
auction ends when participants accept the allocation suggested by the current highest
bids. Accepting the allocation here means that any of the bidders do not outbid the
standing high bid on any of the licenses. Once every participant has passed on the
option to place a qualifying bid, i.e., accepted the allocation at current prices, the
auction ends. The German auction had only two participants and ten homogeneous
licenses for sale, which made the auction relatively simple. Uniform pricing was used
and the minimum bid increment was set at 10 %.(Grimm et al., 2003)
A simultaneous ascending clock auction was applied in the first Nigerian spectrum auc-
tion in 2001 where three available licenses were auctioned among five participants. The
setting was especially favorable for a simultaneous clock auction as the licenses were
considered homogenous and any participant could win a maximum of one license. To
address the possibility of having the demand drop from above supply to below supply
during a single round, leaving unallocated licenses, the Anglo-Dutch variant of a clock
auction was used. The Anglo-Dutch auction was first proposed by Klemperer (2002)
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and it was considered an option for the UK spectrum auction in 2000. The model is
a two-stage process which consists of a clock phase and a single-round sealed-bid n:th
price auction. In Nigeria’s case this would have meant that if the demand had dropped
from, e.g., 4 to 2 over a single round then the unallocated item would have been sold
using a third-price sealed-bid auction among the bidders who had not yet secured a
license in the clock phase. Furthermore, had the number of participants exceeded the
number of licenses by only one, a fourth-price sealed-bid auction would have been used
instead of a clock auction. However, since neither of these conditions were met in the
auction, the licenses were effectively allocated using a simultaneous ascending clock
auction. During each round the auctioneer announced the prices for the licenses and
the bidders submitted a YES or NO answer indicating whether they accept the price
or not. The bidders were also granted three waivers that could be used during any
round of the auction. The maximum round-to-round price increase was set at 10 % but
since the participants were not allowed to consult their financiers during the auction,
an additional rule stated that the price per license could only increase by 50 % during
any day. If this condition is met, the auction would end for the day giving participants
an opportunity to discuss strategy with their financial backers. The auction lasted for
three days.(Lee, 2003)
Even though ascending clock auction model has been overshadowed by the SMRA
model in spectrum allocation, it can be advantageous in a competitive setting with
several homogeneous spectrum licenses. In this case ascending clock auction is likely to
produce the same allocation as SMRA but in much fewer rounds, as discussed in Chapter
3.2. More importantly, ascending clock auction is a vital part of the combinatorial clock
auction (CCA) model which is widely considered the most prominent allocation method
for spectrum licenses. CCA model will be covered in detail in Chapter 5.
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4.3 Issues faced in spectrum auctions
Ever since the adoption of auctions in spectrum allocation, governments have faced sev-
eral issues related to them. Some of the issues are specific to certain auction types while
others are more universal problems with multi-object auctions. This chapter covers the
most serious problems related to spectrum auctions. Many of these issues have been
successfully eliminated by enforcing strict rules, but others still pose a considerable risk
when organizing spectrum auctions.
Demand reduction
Demand reduction is one of the main concerns in all multi-unit auctions. If several
identical products are sold at the same time, there is a clear incentive for the participants
to stop bidding early and therefore keep the prices low for all the items, as discussed in
Chapter 3.4. One of the most obvious cases of demand reduction is discussed by Grimm
et. al. (2003). In 1999 the German 3G auction, briefly mentioned in the previous
chapter, was implemented using a sequential clock auction model and the auction rules
stated that each new bid should exceed the previous highest bid by at least 10 %. Total
of 10 frequency blocks were sold in the auction and there were only two major players
participating in the auction, Mannesman and T-Mobile. In the first round Mannesman
bid DM 18.18 million for blocks 1-5 and DM 20 million for blocks 6-10. By doing so
Mannesman was suggesting a 50-50 division of spectrum: by increasing Mannesman bid
on blocks 1-5 by the minimum of 10 %, and not challenging its bid on blocks 6-10, both
companies would win five blocks at a price of DM 20 million. T-mobile understood
this, bid accordingly, and the auction ended after only two rounds resulting very low
revenues for the government.
Bichler et. al. (2017) analyze the bidding behavior in the German 4G auction in
2015 and find clear evidence of participants trying to find a collusive agreement using
different kind of signaling strategies throughout the auction. While in this particular
action the participants did not find a collusive agreement regarding the allocation of
the licenses and the auction ended up being relatively successful, the auction rules did
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enable an opportunity for bidders to collude.
Signaling
Bid signaling refers to the action of bidders where they bid according to certain rules in
order to inform their competitors of their strategies. One of the most common ways to
do so is the use of retaliatory bids. Retaliatory bids are one bidder’s way of punishing the
competitors who are bidding on a license they want to acquire. Cramton and Ockenfels
(2017) find evidence of retaliatory bidding behavior in the German 4G auction held
in 2010, while Cramton and Schwartz (2000) describe the use of retaliatory bids in an
FCC auction for personal communication services in Texas in 1996-1997. What makes
the latter case interesting is that the retaliatory bids were combined with the use of
trailing digits, another signaling tactic. Two participants, Mercury PCS and High
Plains Wireless, were battling to win the license for Lubbock, Texas. On round 121 of
the auction Mercury PCS placed a highest bid on another license High Plains Wireless
was the standing bidder on. This was Mercury’s first bid for the specific license, and
the bid amount ended with digits ”264”, which was the area code for Lubbock, Texas.
This was Mercury PCS’s way of telling its competitor that if they do not back off from
Lubbock license, they will be punished elsewhere and will have to pay a higher price
for the other licenses. The use of trailing digits has since been successfully prevented
by implementing rounding requirements for the bid amounts.
Other means of signaling include actions such as jump bids (increasing a bid by more
than the minimum amount (Bajari and Yeo, 2009)) and bid withdrawals (bidding high
on a certain license and then immediately withdrawing the bid (Cramton and Schwartz,
2000)).
Many of these methods can be eliminated by enforcing strict rules in the auction, but
bid signaling in general can be difficult to eliminate without decreasing the openess and
transparency of the auction process.
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Exposure risk
Exposure risk arises when a bidder’s valuation for a bundle is higher than the sum
of individual products’ stand-alone values. This can happen when there are comple-
mentarities between different products and package bidding is not allowed. Consider a
VCG auction where two identical spectrum blocks P1 and P2 are being sold. Bidder
A’s valuations Vi for P1, P2, and the combination P1+P2 are VP1 = 4, VP2 = 4, and
VP1+P2 = 12. As discussed previously, in a VCG auction the dominant strategy is to bid
truthfully and therefore if any bidder could win a maximum of one product, it would be
optimal for A to bid 4 for both products. However, if winning multiple items is allowed,
it becomes optimal for A to increase her bids for both blocks, therefore bidding more
than either block’s stand-alone value. When doing so, A runs the risk of winning only
one block and paying too high of a price for it. This is referred to as exposure risk
and if it happens, the allocation is not efficient because the full value of the spectrum
is not realized. Moreover, in a competitive auction a risk-averse bidder is likely to bid
maximum of 4 for each block, therefore restricting herself from bidding according to
her true valuations.(Chan et al., 2003; Cramton et al., 2006) In SMRAs exposure risk
is often tackled by allowing bidders to withdraw standing high bids or shift their bids
from one block to another, but this increases the bidders’ ability to use signaling tactics
by, e.g., exercising predatory bidding. Another option to limit exposure risk is to allow
re-sale of spectrum blocks after the auction but the downside is that this may attract
insincere bidders who are looking to win licenses with only re-sale in mind, which can
easily lead to inefficient allocation. Cramton and Ockenfels (2017) analyze the bidding
behavior in the German spectrum auction in 2010 and speculate that this might have
been E-Plus’s objective in the auction. E-Plus reduced demand early in the auction
possibly hoping that it might incentivize larger operators to follow suit and therefore
create a low-revenue outcome.
Unallocated spectrum
One of the worst possible outcomes in a spectrum auction is one where significant part
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of the spectrum is left unallocated. The biggest issue with unallocated spectrum is that
it can be difficult for the government to sell the unallocated licenses after the auction has
ended without hurting its credibility in the future auctions. If, for example, unallocated
licenses were solds after the auction for a lower price than in the auction, the bidders in
future auction may not take the auction seriously knowing that if all of the licenses are
not sold they might have a real chance of acquiring those licenses for a cheaper price
after the auction.(Klemperer, 2002) Moreover, if all of the spectrum is not allocated
the auction outcome is not likely to be efficient either. Therefore it is important for the
auctioneer to design the process in a way that ensures the full allocation of the spectrum
(or as close to it as possible). Fortunately in majority of spectrum auction worldwide
there has been no significant portion of the spectrum left unallocated but this was the
case in, e.g., Turkey (2000). In the first Nigerian spectrum auction, described in the
previous chapter, one of the winners ended up defaulting on their payment transferring
the spectrum right for that specific license back to the government. While payment
default issues may sometimes be difficult to foresee they can be minimized by ensuring
that the participants are serious about the auction. In the developed world payment
defaults are far less likely due to strong institutions and functioning capital markets,
and a simple entry fee is often enough to ensure seriousness of bidders. In the developing
world the auctioneer often requires the participants to make sizable deposits prior to
auction. These deposits will count towards the payments and therefore act mostly as a
proof of financing, although they can also be used to enforce auction rules by defining
the deposit forfeited in case the rules are broken.(Lee, 2003)
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5 Combinatorial clock auction model in spectrum
auctions
Over the past decade the most prominent auction model for spectrum auctions has
been the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) model, which combines package bidding
with dynamic price discovery. The main fundamental difference between combinatorial
auction model and SMRA is that the former allows bidders to bid on arbitrary bundles
of items, rather than on single items or pre-determined packages. This feature limits or
completely eliminates the exposure risk, which has been an issue with SMRA and other
models in the past. Elimination of exposure risk has become increasingly important
in modern spectrum auctions where it is common to sell licenses for several frequency
ranges in one auction, which often creates more complementarities across licenses as
well as increases the number of potential packages bidders might be interested in.
The use of CCA model in spectrum auctions was first introduced by Ausubel, Cramton,
and Milgrom in 2006, and it was adopted quickly after that by the UK communications
regulator Ofcom in 2008. Since then, the popularity of CCA model in spectrum auctions
has increased rapidly and it has replaced SMRA as the most popular auction model
in spectrum allocation. So far CCA model has been successfully applied in spectrum
auctions in, e.g., Denmark (2010), The Netherlands (2012), and Canada (2014 and
2015).(Mochon and Saez, 2017)
5.1 Auction process
Combinatorial clock auction is a two-stage process: The first stage is called the clock
round and the second stage is usually referred to as supplementary round.9 During the
clock round the prices are increased step by step by the seller and bidders respond by
submitting their demands for packages they are interested in at each price level. In the
supplementary round the bidders can improve their bids from the clock round as well
as submit bids for new packages they are interested in. After the supplementary round
9Clock round is often also referred to as allocation stage while common alternative names for the
supplementary round are assignment stage and proxy phase.
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a winner-determination algorithm is used to solve for the optimal allocation of licenses.
While the auction process is fairly complex, strategically the auction can become simple
as the auction rules are structured in a way that truthful bidding is strategically optimal
regardless of competitors’ strategies.
5.1.1 Clock round
Clock round works like a traditional clock auction where the auctioneer raises the prices
step by step and in each round the participants express their demand for spectrum at
the current prices. Clock auction is similar to a simultaneous ascending auction used
by the FCC, but it has the advantage of being faster when the items are substitutes, as
discussed in Chapter 3.2. In the FCC auctions each item has a price associated with it
and bidders can bid on any of the items. If the number of items is large and there are
many bidders, it can take a long time until the price of each item has increased enough
that there is no further bidding. However, when selling a set of homogenous items in
a clock auction, the process becomes much simpler. Bidders simply must determine
how many items they demand at the current price level and submit their bids to the
auctioneer. Ausubel and Cramton (2004) show that bidding truthfully is an optimal
strategy in clock auctions and leads to a competitive allocation, which makes the clock
auction attractive from seller’s point of view. The downside is that clock auctions are
especially vulnerable to collusion as there may exist low-revenue equilibria that makes
it profitable for bidders to reduce their demand early in the auction to enable low
market-clearing prices, as discussed in Chapter 3.4.
In modern spectrum auctions the items are rarely homogenous but significant com-
plementarities across individual items may be present. This complicates the auction
design but does not rule out the use of clock auctions. In this case each item has a
price associated with it and the prices move individually.10 If the demand for a specific
item is above supply, the item is said to be oversubscribed. Likewise, if the demand
10There may exist sets of items that are assigned a common price but for the sake if simplicity this
possibility is ignored here.
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is below supply, the item is said to be undersubscribed. At the end of each round the
auctioneer raises the price for all oversubscribed items while the prices for other items
remain unchanged. This makes the auction somewhat more complicated for the par-
ticipants. Now the bidders must not only decide how many items to demand, but also
which items to demand. Furthermore, it is possible that for a single bidder there exists
multiple optimal choices during one round and in that case the bidder must decide
between them as the auction rules generally prevent bidders from placing multiple bids
during one round. While this might make it more difficult for the bidders to find the
optimal strategy, clock auctions are efficient in eliminating the exposure risk, which is
an issue with, e.g., SMRAs.
One inherent problem with clock auctions is that it is easily possible that the auction
ends with some items being undersubscribed. For example, consider an auction with
ten homogenous items. The demand in round N-1 is DN−1 = 11, which means that
the auctioneer raises the price for round N. Suppose that as a result the demand drops
to 9 and the auction ends. Usually a situation like this is prevented by requiring
bidders to submit additional information to the auctioneer that helps to determine
how to allocate the undersubscribed items at the end of the auction. For example,
Ausubel and Cramton (2004) suggest that the auctioneer could require the participants
to submit bids also at intermediate prices (prices between PN−1 and PN), which could
then be used to determine which bidder has the highest marginal valuation for the
unsold items.(Milgrom, 2004b)
With heterogenous items, however, things get more complicated. Let us consider a
hypothetical situation where six heterogenous items {A, B, C, D, E, F} are sold and
the auction has four participants {B1, B2, B3, B4}. The bidding behavior is illustrated
in Table 8 where each row shows the bidding behavior of each bidder throughout the
auction. For example, in round 1 bidder B2’s demand is a set {A, B}.
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Table 8: Clock auction with heterogenous items.11
Round B1 B2 B3 B4 Post-round actions
1 A AB CD F Price for A increased
2 A EF CD F Price for F increased
3 A EF CD - Auction ends
After round 2 the price for item F is increased causing bidder B4 to drop out of the
auction. As a result there are no oversubscribed items and the auction ends. Item B
is undersubscribed and is not sold to anyone. Throughout the auction bidder B2 is the
only bidder that has placed a bid on item B, but given that she won the package {E,
F}, it is unlikely that her marginal valuation for item B is above the reserve price so
previous bidding behavior can not be used to allocate the unsold item.
This is where CCA shows its strength. Having unsold items at the end of the auction is
not an issue because the auction does not end with the clock round, but just moves on to
the second stage where undersubscribed items are sold. The purpose of the clock round
is to reveal the bidders’ preferences and set the reserve prices for the supplementary
round. Once the market clearing demand is reached, the auction moves on to the second
stage.
5.1.2 Supplementary round
Once the clock round is completed, the auction moves on to the supplementary round
with all clock round’s winners. In the supplementary round the bidders can place
additional bids on other packages they wish to acquire, or increase their standing high
bid on the package they won in the clock round. Supplementary round is essentially a
single-round auction with sealed bids and modified Vickrey pricing.12 In a sealed-bid
auction all bidders submit their bids to the auctioneer at the same time and have only
their private information to work with when determining the optimal bid amounts.
This makes sealed-bid auctions more opaque than open auctions, but at the same time
11It is easy to see how the example is not very realistic but it still illustrates the problem that may
arise in a clock auction with heterogenous items.
12The pricing rules of the auction will be covered in greater detail in Chapter 5.2.2.
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sealed-bid nature of the auction reduces the threat of collusion.(Ausubel and Baranov,
2014; Athey et al., 2011; Gupta, 2002)
Once the supplementary round ends, all bids, including the those from the clock round,
are entered into a winner determination problem and the value-maximizing allocation
of the spectrum is solved.
5.2 Auction rules
Combinatorial clock auctions, just like any other spectrum auction model, require care-
fully planned rules in order to eliminate the issues described in Chapter 4.3 and fulfill
the auction goals discussed in Chapter 2.2. Many of the rules, such as the limit on
how many licenses a single bidder can obtain or the conditions that apply to the resale
of licenses, are relatively straightforward. However, there are two types of rules that
need to be designed with extreme caution in order to ensure a successful auction: The
activity rules and the pricing rules.
5.2.1 Activity rules
Activity rules are a key element in all multi-item auctions but play even a more vital
role in spectrum auctions due to the nature of the auction. The most straightforward
activity rule simply limits the number of rounds bidders are allowed to be inactive on
(not place qualifying bids), and once that number is reached, the next round of inactivity
means that the participant is not eligible to bid on any of the following rounds. A rule
like that can be viable in certain cases, e.g., if each participant is allowed to win only
one block and all blocks are substitutes, like in the Nigerian spectrum auction described
in Chapter 4.2. In an auction where bidders are bidding for multiple spectrum blocks,
this kind of activity rule would not be effective as participants could simply place bids
on very low number of frequency blocks in the early rounds, not revealing their true
intentions but still remaining active in the auction.
Another common, slightly more effective activity rule is a quantity-based rule, which
restricts the participants from increasing the number of blocks they bid on throughout
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the auction, i.e., if some participant bids on three blocks in round one, she can ever
only bid on maximum of three blocks in the future rounds. A variation of this is an
eligibility-point rule, which is based on the same idea but bidders are allowed to bid
based on the amount of eligibility points they hold, which depends on their bidding
behavior in the previous round. The biggest advantage of these kind of rules is the sim-
plicity, but there are still major issues if there exists complementarities across products.
If all blocks are substitutes, participants would simply bid on the blocks with the low-
est current prices and reduce their demand if the prices increased too much. However,
with complementary blocks, participants would still be incentivized to bid on blocks
with the lowest current prices, regardless of whether they are truly interested in those
blocks or not. In other words, the participants are not encouraged to bid truthfully.
Bidding just to maintain eligibility is often referred to as parking.(Mochon and Saez,
2017) Therefore, a more complicated rule is required for CCA model and one based on
revealed preference was proposed by Ausubel et. al. (2006).
Revealed preference activity rule
Revealed preference activity rule states that the bidders can change their bid from one
package to another if the package they are shifting to is relatively cheaper. Bidders are
allowed to increase the package size, but given that the new package must be relatively
cheaper, issues such as bid sniping or parking are not as big of a problem. The rule is
designed in a manner that encourages bidders to bid truthfully, i.e., bid on the profit-
maximizing package, throughout the clock round in order to maintain as much flexibility
as possible for the supplementary round.(Ausubel and Baranov, 2017)
The revealed preference activity rule is best illustraded with an example. The following
example is an extension of the one used by Levin and Skrzypacz (2016). Let us consider
an auction with two bidders A and B who are competing in an auction for 10 seemingly
identical frequency blocks with reserve price per block set at 10. Suppose that Bidder
A’s valuation for x ∈ [0, 10] blocks is
VA(x) = 20x− 1
2
x2 (1)
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and therefore her marginal value is
V ′A(x) = 20− x. (2)
A’s demand function is thus
xA(p) = 20− p (3)
and her inverse demand function is
pA(x) = 20− x. (4)
Bidder A’s bid amounts follow the rule
bA(x) = x · pA(x) = 20x− x2 (5)
In the first round A’s demand is 10 blocks and her bid b1 = 100. Meanwhile, according
to Equation 1, A values 10 blocks at 150 and therefore her consumer surplus, or profit,
is 50. As the auctioneer increases the price per block, A’s consumer surplus for each
package changes according to Table 9. Bolded values indicate the profit-maximizing
package for A at different price levels.
Table 9: Bidder A’s consumer surplus for different packages at different price levels.
Price 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
10 9.5 18 25.5 32 37.5 42 45.5 48 49.5 50
10.5 9 17 24 30 35 39 42 44 45 45
11 8.5 16 22.5 28 32.5 36 38.5 40 40.5 40
11.5 8 15 21 26 30 33 35 36 36 35
12 7.5 14 19.5 24 27.5 30 31.5 32 31.5 30
12.5 7 13 18 22 25 27 28 28 27 25
13 6.5 12 16.5 20 22.5 24 24.5 24 22.5 20
14 5.5 10 13.5 16 17.5 18 17.5 16 13.5 10
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Once the auction reaches a point where there is no excess demand, i.e, DA +DB ≤ 10,
the clock round ends. Suppose this happens when the price per block is 13 and therefore
A’s final bid is 91 for 7 spectrum blocks.
The clock round bidding behavior can reflect on the bidders’ options in the supplemen-
tary round in different ways depending on which cap rule is imposed on bidders. Cap
rule determines the constraints for the supplementary bids imposed by the bids made
in the clock round. The most common options are relative cap rule and final cap rule.
The relative cap rule states that if in the supplementary round a bidder wants to increase
package size from the clock round, the bid amount is restricted by the bid they made
in the last clock round where the eligibility was high enough to bid on the package in
question. In other words, say that in round t a bidder reduced their demand from qx
to qt and now wishes to make a supplementary bid on qx. Then the supplementary bid
on qx is constrained by inequality
b(qx) ≤ b(qt) + (qx − qt) · pt. (6)
The idea behind relative cap is that since the bidder reduced her demand in round t,
she revealed that the maximum she would be willing to pay for the package qx is her
bid in round t plus the difference in package prices between rounds t and the previous
round x. To better illustrate this, consider the bidding behavior in Table 9 when price
increases from 12.5 to 13. When this happens bidder A reduces her demand from 8 to
7 and A’s bids for 8 and 7 items are therefore 100 and 91, respectively.
Now if she wishes to bid on 8 items in the supplementary round, the bid amount
is constrained by Equation 6. By plugging in the numbers the equation takes form
b(8) ≤ 91 + (8 − 7) · 13, or b(8) ≤ 104. The result is intuitive: if A was willing to pay
more than 104 for 8 items then it would have not made sense for her to reduce her
demand from 8 to 7 when the price increased to 13.
Another commonly suggested cap rule is the final cap rule, which states that all sup-
38
plementary bids are contrained by the packages bid on in the final clock round f :
b(q) ≤ b(qf ) + (q − qf ) · pf (7)
The main difference is that the final cap rule also constrains the bids on smaller packages
in the supplementary round. The idea behind this is that it should not make sense for
a bidder to signal a higher valuation for a smaller package than she bid on in the final
clock round because she had the option of bidding on this smaller package then, but
chose not to.
Third, less commonly suggested, cap rule is the intermediate cap, which states that the
supplementary round bids are restricted by all eligibility-reducing rounds in the clock
round, not only by the last round where the eligibility was high enough to bid for the
package in question (relative cap) or by the final clock round (final cap).
The most commonly used version is the relative cap13 and the example presented here
will also follow this rule.
So what are A’s options for bidding in the supplementary round? First of all, the
revealed preference activity rule states that the bidders are not allowed to decrease their
bids for packages they previously bid on (they have already signaled that they value
the package at certain value, so they can not now bid less than that signaled valuation),
therefore the bidding curve bA(x) sets the lower boundary for A’s supplementary round
bids. Second of all, A’s supplementary bids can not signal a higher marginal value
than her original valuation curve. If we call the upper boundary of A’s bids SA(x),
then S ′A(x) ≤ V ′A(x) must apply. In other words, SA(x) rises at an equal rate to VA(x),
which means that the distance between VA(x) and SA(x) is constant at VA(7) - bA(7).
The equation for SA(x) thus is
SA(x) = 20x− 1
2
x2 − (115.5− 91) = 20x− 1
2
x2 − 24.5. (8)
Figure 4 summarizes the analysis. The area between SA(x) and bA(x) shows A’s allowed
13Relative cap rule was used in, e.g., Switzerland (2012), Ireland (2012), and UK (2013).
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Figure 4: Curves SA(x) and bA(x) define bidder A’s options for supplementary round
bids.
bids in the supplementary round subject to the activity rules. For x < 7 A is allowed to
bid any non-negative amount as she has not revealed her preference to those packages.
Similarly, for x = 7 A is allowed to increase her bid because at this point she has only
signaled that she is willing to pay at least 91 to that package.
Naturally the revealed preference rule becomes much more complicated when licenses
with varying values or licenses for different geographical regions are auctioned at the
same time, but the fundamental mechanism is the same: By always bidding for the most
valuable package throughout the clock round, the bidders maintain the most flexibility
in the supplementary round.
5.2.2 Pricing rules
When determining the price the winner of the auction has to pay, most auction for-
mats rely on either first-price (winner pays their own bid) or second-price (price is the
highest losing bid) rule. However, in CCAs neither of these pricing rules is applicable.
Ausubel et. al. (2014) show that the use of first-price rule in a uniform price auction
with multiple units can encourage bidders to reduce demand, therefore leading to inef-
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ficiencies in the clock round. With Vicrey-pricing, the dominant strategy is to bid the
true valuation and the winners win the incremental value created by their bids (i.e.,
if the winning bid is 50 higher than the second highest bid, the winning bid increased
the value of the item by 50, but the price the winner pays is 50 less than their bid).
However, when complementarities are present, Vicrey-prices may easily become too low
and lead to inefficiencies. Therefore, a more complicated pricing mechanism is required
and one of the most prominent ones is called Vickrey-nearest-core pricing, which was
proposed by Cramton (2013).
Vickrey-nearest-core pricing
Vickrey-nearest-core pricing rule is a modification of Vickrey-pricing that takes into
account the constraints introduced by complementarities. The model is best described
with a simple example. First consider a situation where two products A and B are
auctioned among three bidders B1, B2, and B3. Suppose their valuations Vi for the
products are:
VA(B1) = 4, VB(B2) = 4, VA(B3) = VB(B3) = 1.
In this case it would be feasible to use Vickrey pricing and the items would be sold to
bidders B1 and B2 at a price of 1 per item. Figure 5 illustrates the pricing solution
graphically.
Let us now introduce a fourth bidder B4 whose valuation for each individual item is
zero, but for the bundle A+B her valuation is 3. The Vickrey solution is still the same,
to sell A and B to bidders B1 and B2, respectively, and the total revenue is still 2.
However, in this case bidder B4 would have a reason to be upset as she offered to pay
3 for the combination of A + B, which is more than the revenue auctioneer collected
from B1 and B2. Clearly the use of Vickrey-pricing in this case is not efficient and this
is caused by complementarities between the products. In this case the prices are said
to not be in the core as some combination of bidders would have been willing to pay
more for the products than what the winners paid. Figure 6 illustrates the situation.
The core in this case is smaller as the points within the red triangle are not efficient
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Figure 5: Pricing problem with substitutes. Vickrey-prices lie in the south-west corner
of the core.
solutions to the pricing problem.
To solve this, one or both of the payments must be increased in order to find a combi-
nation of prices for A and B that support efficient allocation (B1 wins A and B2 wins
B) and leave no bidders upset. As the name of the pricing model suggests, the point
closest to the Vicrey-prices is chosen, which in this case is the point P ∗ = (1.5, 1.5),
meaning that the items A and B are sold to bidders B1 and B2 at a price of 1.5 each. It
is important to note that all points on the south-west facing border of the core would
result in the same revenue for the seller (i.e., would be bidder-optimal), but the point
with the lowest distance from the Vicrey-prices is the fairest solution.
This particular example is rather easy to solve, but when auctioning multiple spectrum
blocks at the same time to bidders with different complementary valuations, the final
allocation must be solved using a computer algorithm. This problem of solving the
efficient allocation given a set of bids is called a winner determination problem.
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Figure 6: Pricing problem with complementarities. Vickrey-prices are outside of the
core.
5.3 Winner determination problem
Winner determinations problem (WDP) is a combinatorial optimization problem that
must be solved to find the revenue-maximizing solution subject to the constraints cre-
ated by the activity and pricing rules. All bids from the auction are submitted into the
WDP and allocations violating these constraints are eliminated one by one. The most
important characteristic of the WDP is the bidding language, which determines how in-
dividual bids are treated. CCAs have traditionally used a fully expressive Exclusive-OR
(XOR) bidding language that treats all bids from the clock around and the supplemen-
tary round as mutually exclusive, all-or-nothing bids. In practice this means that when
a bidder submits multiple package bids throughout the auction, the winner determina-
tion algorithm considers only solutions where each bidder can have a maximum of one
winning bid. For example if a bidder submits package bids {A1, A2, A3} and {B1, B2,
B3}, they can only ever win one of these packages and never both of them. While XOR
language allows bidders to express their valuation for any package, as the number of
licenses increases the WDP becomes more and more complex. Going into the details of
the programmatic side of WDPs would be out of the scope of this paper14, but issues
14For more information about WDPs in combinatorial auctions, see, e.g., (Lehmann et al., 2005).
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created by bidding languages will be discussed further in Chapter 5.5.
5.4 Advantages of CCAs
By far the biggest advantage of CCA compared to SMRA is the model’s ability to
work efficiently with complementary items and therefore eliminating the exposure risk.
By allowing participants to bid on arbitrary packages instead of individual items, the
bidders win either the whole package or nothing at all, meaning that they do not have
to worry about winning only some of the items and overpaying for them. Moreover,
this also shifts the burden of bundling the items appropriately from the auctioneer to
the bidders who often have more information regarding the complementary nature of
the items. Furthermore, this makes CCA a technology-neutral auction model: In some
cases there may be competing technologies that require different amounts of spectrum,
which would make efficient bundling before the auction especially difficult.
Carefully planned activity and pricing rules encourage participants to bid truthfully
throughout the auction. Truthful bidding being the optimal strategy is of utmost
importance, because it makes the auction strategically simple regardless of the other-
wise complex rule set. In a CCA with relative cap activity rule, by bidding on the
most profitable package throughout the clock round, the bidders maximize flexibil-
ity in the supplementary round. Truthful bidding is further encouraged by using a
payment-minimizing Vickrey-nearest-core pricing rule when solving the final allocation
of licenses. Truthful bidding, in turn, enhances price discovery: The marginal value
of products can be derived from the bidding behavior. Price discovery is important
especially in spectrum auctions because the real value of the spectrum is difficult to
determine. The importance of price discovery is further magnified in an auction with
multiple items for sale as the valuation process gets much more complicated. The
revealed-preference activity rule also removes the incentives for bidders to reduce de-
mand in the clock round as that would limit their options in the supplementary round.
Additionally, the revealed-preference activity rule also helps to reduce other collusive
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agreements and bid sniping opportunities.
5.5 Potential issues in CCAs
While the combinatorial clock auction model successfully eliminates many of the issues
associated with SMRA model, many potential problems still exist. Moreover, many
of the benefits are theoretical and rely on assumptions such as independent valuation
models and bidders understanding and following the optimal strategies, but empirical
results show that these assumptions are not always valid. Kroemer et. al. (2016)
study the bidding behavior in several combinatorial clock auctions and find that the
bidding behavior in reality is often not turthful, i.e., bidders do not bid according to a
profit-maximizing strategy.
Untruthful bidding behavior may be a result of bidders’ willingness to drive up com-
petitors’ prices. Janssen and Karamychev (2013) discuss different strategies in a CCA
with heterogenous items under the assumption that bidders do not only care about
their own payments but also their rivals’ payments. They show that under the final
cap rule in the supplementary round, bidders have the option to place high bids on
the packages they are not truly interested in with no risk of actually having to pay for
those packages, and that way they can drive up the prices their competitors must pay
for the licenses. Knapek and Wambach (2013) further discuss spiteful bidding in CCAs
and show that in an auction with two bidders B1 and B2, truthful bidding is not a
dominant strategy for B1 in the clock round if there is a threat of spiteful bidding from
B2, even if B1 herself is only interested in her own payment. They also show that if
a relative cap rule is imposed, the allocation can change in the supplementary round
even if there was no excess supply after the final clock round. Ausubel and Baranov
(2017) discuss this same property of the relative cap rule and show that in order to
secure the allocation a bidder won in the clock round, the supplementary bid for the
same package might have to be several times larger than the final bid in the clock phase.
Truthful bidding is one of the most important features that was hoped carry on to the
CCA from a static Vickrey auction, but if it is not a dominant strategy, the difficulty
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of decision-making throughout the auction is increased significantly.
Levin and Skrzypacz (2016) discuss how demand expansion in the clock phase may be
used to relax restrictions in the supplementary round. Consider a situation where two
bidders B1 and B2 who have similar linear valuations are participating in an auction for
one divisible unit of spectrum. If both bid truthfully throughout the clock phase their
demands are always equal and the market clearing is reached when DB1 = DB2 =
1
2
S at
price p = p∗. However, suppose that B1, instead of consistently lowering her demand,
holds her demand at DB1 = S until price is just below p
∗ and then drops her demand
to DB1 =
1
2
S. The final result of the clock phase is the same as before but behaving
inconsistently like this B1 has secured much more relaxed boundaries for her bids in
the supplementary round. Had B2 anticipated B1’s strategy of demand expansion in
the clock phase, the optimal response for her would have been to reduce demand early
in the auction to reach market clearing leading to an inefficient outcome. It is worth
noting that even if B2 reduces her demand, B1 would still obtain an advantage for the
supplementary round.
Other possible reasons for inconsistent bidding behavior are budget constraints imposed
on bidders by the management. These budget constraints may prevent bidders from
placing optimal bids and therefore create inconsistencies in the bidding behavior. While
placing bids exceeding the budget is relatively safe in a CCA, meaning that there is very
little risk of actually having to make these payments, this aspect of the auction might
be hard to explain it to the board of directors and shareholders. Therefore bidders may
be forced to move their bids to cheaper packages even though bidding on a larger, more
expensive package would be more profitable.(Janssen and Karamychev, 2013; Knapek
and Wambach, 2013)
Another potential source for inefficient auction outcome is a large number of potential
packages available to bidders leading to a phenomenon referred to as missing bids. Bich-
ler et. al. (2014) show that CCA may lead to low revenues if the number of licenses is
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large. When the number of licenses increases, the number of possible packages increases
exponentially, which leads to a situation where only a fraction of possible packages are
actually bid on in the supplementary round. For example, in a UK spectrum auction
in 2013 bidders submitted between 8 and 62 package bids in the supplementary round,
but total number of possible packages was 750. It is unlikely that the bidders had
zero-valuation for packages they did not bid on but they are treated as such when
solving the optimal allocation. The issue of missing bids was also noticed in, e.g., two
of the UK spectrum auctions in 2008 where the number of licenses resulted in tens of
thousands of potential packages. When the number of potential bundles is this large,
it is easy to see that even if the bidders fully understand the auction model and the
optimal strategy, it is impractical to place hundreds or even thousands bids in the sup-
plementary round. Missing bids become an even more severe issue when licenses for
several frequency bands are auctioned at the same time as this can increase the number
of potential packages to millions. (Bichler et al., 2013)
Missing bids issues is largely created by the XOR bidding language used in the winner
determination problem in CCAs. While a fully expressive bidding language sounds
attractive, in reality the number of potential packages is often so large that it is not
feasible for bidders to communicate all possible valuations even if they acknowledged
them. To illustrate this, consider a situation where there are five items a bidder is
interested in the supplementary round and she has a positive marginal value for any
combination of items. In this case the bidder would have to submit individual bids for
any individual item, any pair of items, any three items, any four items, and for the
whole package of five items totaling
(
5
1
)
+
(
5
2
)
+
(
5
3
)
+
(
5
4
)
+
(
5
5
)
= 5 + 10 + 10 + 5 + 1 = 31
bids.
While 31 bids is hardy impossible, with the introduction of regional licenses and multiple
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frequency bands the number quickly grows unfeasible. Additionally, regulators are often
forced to limit the maximum number of bids in order to keep the dimensions of the
winner determination problem manageable, which means that, in theory, bidders may
not be able to express all the valuation they would like to do so.
Missing bids is especially worrisome for the auctioneer as it can easily lead to unallo-
cated licenses at the end of the auction despite seemingly sufficient demand. In fact,
this has been noticed in some of the past CCAs15 and similar results were noticed in a
lab experiment by ran by Bichler et. al. (2013).
One potential improvement is to allow bidders to place mutually inclusive OR bids in
the supplementary round that can be treated as additive to their clock round package.
This can significantly reduce the number of required bids in the supplementary round.
To illustrate this, consider the previous situation where a bidder is interested in 1-5
items in the supplementary round. With XOR bid language it required 31 separate
bids to express all possible combinations of those 5 licenses. With OR bid language it
would be enough for the bidder to submit a bid for each of the 5 licenses and they can
win any combination of the licenses, reducing the number of bids by 84 %.
The downside of the OR language is that sometimes bidders want to submit mutually
exclusive bids. Consider a situation where licenses for two frequency bands A and B are
sold in the same auction. An operator might be interested in licenses in both bands,
but not at the same time, i.e., she only wants to win licenses in one of the bands. With
XOR language she could submit bids such as {A1, A2} and {B1, B2} and she could
ever win only one of the packages. With OR language, however, she could theoretically
win both of the packages and end up overpaying for one of them. Bichler et. al. (2013)
discuss the possibility of using a hybrid language, which they call OR-of-XOR bidding
language. In this case the bids within frequency bands are treated as OR bids, while
bids across frequency bands are treated as mutually exclusive XOR bids. The argument
behind a bidding language like this is that the complementarities rarely reach across
15For example in Slovenia in 2014 20 MHz was left un allocated in the 800 MHz band and in the
Netherlands in 2010 55 MHz was unsold in the 2.6 GHz band.
48
frequency bands and therefore there is less need to be able to express complex valua-
tions. They run simulations comparing the XOR and OR-of-XOR languages and find
that the latter results in a higher efficiency, while also simplifying the auction process
and winner determination problem. This kind of bidding language might be especially
useful in markets with regional licenses, e.g., the US or Canada.
The final problem CCA is facing is the complexity of the model. Even if the auctioneer
was able to tweak all the rules in a way that it is truly optimal for bidders to bid
truthfully regardless of their competitors’ actions, it would still be a tough sell for
the financiers and board members. This often means that regardless of the model’s
theoretical soundness, the operators are always required to hire experts to consult in
the strategic planning before the auction, requiring plenty of resources that might not
be needed if a simpler auction model was used.
5.6 Empirical results from combinatorial clock auctions
Combinatorial clock auction model has been used in spectrum auction around the world
relatively frequently over the past decade, and it is constantly gaining more and more
attention from the regulators. This Chapter takes a look at the results from some of
the combinatorial clock auctions organized in European countries during 2010-2015 and
compares them to the results obtained with other auction models, mainly SMRA during
the same period. This time period is chosen for the analysis because during that time
many countries had already adopted CCA model for spectrum auctions, while many
other countries still used SMRA and other models to allocate the licenses for same fre-
quencies. The analysis concentrates on allocation of spectrum right on four important
frequency ranges: 800 MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, and 2600 MHz. The next important
frequency range is the 700 MHz range, which operators can use to strengthen their
4G plans or develop 5G services (700 MHz range is sometimes referred to as pre-5G
frequencies). So far 700 MHz licenses have been sold in, e.g., Germany (2015), France
(2015), Finland (2016), Italy (2018), and Sweden (2018). However, none of the Eu-
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ropean countries have allocated these licenses using a CCA model and therefore these
licenses are omitted from the analysis here. However, this would be a logical next step
as several countries are expected to sell the 700 MHz licenses together with licenses for
other frequencies suitable for 5G applications and at least Ofcom (The UK regulator)
is planning to do so using a CCA model.(Ofcom, 2018)
Validating an auction model for spectrum auctions can be extremely difficult for sev-
eral reasons. First of all, the end goals are relatively complicated as opposed to, e.g.,
a single-item auction ran by a revenue-maximizing seller. A complete analysis would
require for example post-auction analysis of the telecommunications market. Since this
would be vastly out of the scope of this paper, this chapter concentrates on revenue-
based metrics of auctions. Second of all, comparing two different spectrum auctions
within a country, e.g., SMRA in 2010 and CCA in 2013, is not feasible because the
spectrum valuations change. Even if one of the auctions resulted in higher revenue it
would not say much about the efficiency of the models if the true value of spectrum
is unknown. Third of all, comparing the sale of same frequency bands in different
countries is often not feasible due to variation in auction rules and legislation across
countries, as well as the differences in the market environment. Lastly, lab experiments
would require a large amount of resources and might not lead to conclusive results, and
field experiments are not feasible due to the size and nature of the problem.
The most common metric used in the literature for evaluating the success of spectrum
auctions is price per megahertz per population [Price/MHz·pop], which measures the
revenue acquired per megahertz per head of population. For example, (Mochon and
Saez, 2017) evaluated the success of CCAs around the world using this metric. The
British regulator Ofcom (2015) took a slightly more advanced approach and derived
UK equivalent prices by adjusting the auction results from other countries for purchas-
ing power parity (PPP). However, since the objective of this chapter is not to present
any definite proof that one model is better than the other, but rather just perform a
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comparison between CCA and other methods, [Price/MHz·pop] values will be used for
simplicity.
Auctions studied here all took place in Europe between 2010 and 2015 and were used
to allocate spectrum within four frequency ranges: 800 MHz, 900 MHz, 1800 MHz, and
2600 MHz.16 A total of 19 auctions are studied, 9 of which were using a CCA model
and 10 some other auction model, in most cases SMRA. Tables 10 and 11 summarize
the total amount of MHz sold in each frequeny range in each auction.
Table 10: Total MHz sold in each frequency range: SMRA and other models.
Country Year(s) 800 MHz 900 MHz 1800 MHz 2600 MHz
Germany 2010 60 - 50 190
Greece 2011 - 70 40 -
Italy 2011 60 - 30 150
Portugal 2011 60 10 84 145
Spain 2011 60 10 - 140
Sweden 2011 60 - 70 -
Romania 2012 - - - -
Czech Republic 2013 60 - 50 190
Greece 2014 60 - - 140
Germany 2015 - 70 100 -
16In some auctions additional frequencies were also auctioned but they are left out of the analysis.
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Table 11: Total MHz sold in each frequency range: CCAs.
Country Year(s) 800 MHz 900 MHz 1800 MHz 2600 MHz
Denmarka 2010, 2012 60 - - 185
Austriab 2010, 2013 60 70 150 190
Ireland 2012 60 70 150 -
Netherlands 2012 60 70 140 180
Switzerland 2012 - 70 140 175
Slovakia 2013 60 - 60 190
Slovenia 2014 60 70 130 185
a800 MHz licenses allocated in 2012 while others in 2010. 900 MHz and 1800 MHz licenses are left
out because incubents were not allowed to bid for those licenses and additionally the license period
was shorter than normally.
b2600 MHz licenses sold in 2010, others in 2013.
Results of the auctions are summarized in Table 12 showing the total MHz sold, total
revenue, and price per MHz per head of population. Ideally the comparison would be
made within each frequency range but in many cases the regulators did not reveal the
frequency range specific revenue information but only the aggregate revenue collected
from the auction. Price information is converted to EUR using the average exchange
rate17 of the auction year and price/MHz·pop is derived using the population census18
of the auction year.
The results show that the price/MHz·pop was 100 % higher in CCAs compared to auc-
tions that used a different auction formats. As discussed before, revenue-based metrics
do not tell the whole story and high revenue does not automatically mean that the
auction was successful and efficient. However, since there is no evidence that any of the
studied auctions resulted in an uncompetitive end market, revenue should be a relatively
accurate measure for successfulness of the auction. Moreover, often when issues such
as exposure risk, collusion, and signaling are present, their consequence is abnormally
low revenues. Therefore, price/MHz·pop can be considered a reasonably good proxy for
17Source: https//www.x-rates.com
18Source: www.google.com
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successfulness of the auction. Given the large difference in price/MHz·pop between the
auction formats, it is safe to say that CCAs seem to work better for spectrum alloca-
tion compared to previously popular methods. A more complete analysis would require
ex-ante and ex-post analysis of the telecommunications markets in auction countries
as well as adjusting the results for GDP and purchasing power. This kind of analysis,
however, is out of the scope of this paper.
Table 12: Auction results. Upper part of the table shows includes the results from
SMRAs and other models while the lower part shows the results from CCAs.
Country Year(s) MHz sold Total revenue
(MEUR)
Price/MHz·pop
(EUR)
Germany 2010 300 3937 0.16
Greece 2011 110 380.5 0.31
Italy 2011 240 3945.5 0.27
Portugal 2011 299 374 0.12
Spain 2011 210 1647 0.17
Sweden 2011 130 375 0.31
Romania 2012 375 682.1 0.09
Czech Republic 2013 300 312 0.10
Greece 2014 200 381.1 0.17
Germany 2015 170 969.6 0.07
Average 0.18
Austria 2010, 2013 470 2053.5 0.52
Denmark 2010, 2012 245 234.6 0.17
Ireland 2012 280 854.6 0.66
Netherlands 2012 450 3800 0.50
Switzerland 2012 385 1203 0.39
Slovakia 2013 310 163.9 0.10
Slovenia 2014 445 148.8 0.16
Average 0.36
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6 Conclusion
Until the mid 1990s the radio spectrum was considered an abundant resource with only
few use cases, and licenses were often awarded using so called beauty contests or lotter-
ies. The problem with beauty contests is the mechanism’s opaqueness and vulnerability
to corruption and favoritism. While lotteries provide a fairer solution, there is no way
of guaranteeing that the spectrum is utilized efficiently. As the demand for spectrum
rights started to increase, a new allocation method was required. The first spectrum
auction was organized in the US in 1994 and ever since it has been the dominant method
in spectrum allocation for governments all over the world.
Auctions have enabled price discovery and help the governments to put the licenses
into the hands of the parties that have the highest valuation for the licenses. This is
a key element in helping the governments to reach its most important goals of efficient
allocation of spectrum rights and promotion of competition in the end market. This in
turn encourages the companies to develop the products faster, increasing the techno-
logical advancement in the country. Additionally, auctions help governments to collect
significant revenues in exchange for the licenses.
Even though auctions have been used in spectrum allocations for a better part of three
decades, there is still no generally accepted best solution when it comes to choosing
the auction mechanism. This is due to differences between the market environments
as well as the differences between individual spectrum blocks. This means that every
spectrum auction should be treated as its own problem and auction design should be
approached carefully and in great detail. However, some auction mechanisms have
grown to be more commonl than others. By far the most commonly used auction
mechanism is the simultaneous multiround auction (SMRA) model which consists of
several English auctions that are ran concurrently. SMRA has shown good results in
many cases and with carefully planned auction rules many shortcomings have been
eliminated effectively. The downside of SMRA is that it requires a lot of resources from
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the auctioneer as well as from the bidders.
When auctioning homogeneous licenses, a good substitute for SMRA is an ascending
clock auction where the seller announces prices and bidders respond by submitting their
demand for spectrum rights at the current price. Despite the simplicity and resource-
friendliness, ascending clock auction model has not gained traction among auctioneers
due to its vulnerability to collusion, and SMRA has dominated the spectrum auction
environment.
Over the past decade the advancement of technology and emergence of new applications
has increased the complementary nature of spectrum licenses - a feature that sets spec-
trum auctions apart from most multi-item auctions. Complementarities across products
introduces the bidders to exposure risk, which is something SMRA has not been able to
handle well. This significantly reduces SMRA’s ability to perform well when auctioning
licenses and has driven economists to develop alternative auction mechanisms. By far
the most prominent candidate has been the combinatorial clock auction (CCA) model
which comprises of two stages, clock round and a sealed-bid supplementary round. With
carefully planned activity rules CCA model is hoped to encourage bidders to act truth-
fully throughout the auction helping the governments to allocate the licenses efficiently
as well as simplify the strategic planning for bidders. CCA is designed to combine the
effectiveness of ascending clock auction model as well as the theoretical soundness of
the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism. The key feature of CCA is that it allows bidders
to bid on arbitrary bundles of products eliminating exposure risk completely.
While CCA is by far the most promising auction model for future spectrum auctions,
several problems still exist. The biggest issue is the model’s reliance on truthful be-
havior of bidders, while studies have shown that this is often not the case even if it is
theoretically optimal. Untruthful behavior is caused by budget constraints and bidders’
willingness to affect their competitors’ prices. Additionally, as the number of licenses
increases the potential number of packages grows exponentially complicating both the
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bidders’ decision making process as well as the optimization problem faced by the seller.
Moreover, the model’s complexity requires companies to dedicate more resources when
planning their strategies for the auction.
Despite the issues still present, the empirical results show that CCA has worked well
in the past. It is, however, important to remember that each spectrum auction should
be treated as its own problem and auction design should be approached accordingly,
without shutting out any of the potential auction mechanisms. While it is safe to say
that CCA model is likely to outperform other models in situations where the threat
of exposure risk is real, i.e., in auctions where several frequency bands are sold at the
same time, especially in fragmented markets with regional licenses, it can easily create
unnecessary complexities in simpler environments. Therefore when fewer licenses are
auctioned or the licenses are substitutes, an ascending clock auction or a SMRA are
likely to produce equally good results but much more effectively.
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